The existence of some 1.5 billion unused EU Allowances (EUAs) at the end of Phase II of the EU's Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) has sparked considerable debate about structural shortcomings of the EU ETS. However, there has been a surprising lack of interest in considering the accumulation of EUAs in light of the theory of intertemporal permit trading, i.e. allowance banking. In this paper we adapt basic banking theory to the case of a continuously declining cap, as is common in greenhouse gas control systems. We show that it is perfectly rational for agents to decrease emissions beyond the constraint imposed by the cap initially, accumulating an allowance bank and then drawing it down in the interest of minimizing abatement cost over time. Having laid out the theory, we carry out a set of simulations for a reasonable range of key parameters, geared to the EU ETS, to illustrate the e¤ects of intertemporal optimization of abatement decisions on optimal time paths of emissions and allowance prices. Our simulations yield banking behavior which is broadly consistent with ex post data from the EU ETS. We conclude that bank accumulation as the result of intertemporal abatement cost optimization should be considered at least a partial explanation when evaluating the current discrepancy between the cap and observed emissions.
Introduction
The existence of a 1.5 bilion surplus of unused allowances at the end of Phase II of the European Union's Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), roughly 15% of the …ve-year cap, is often cited as the cause of the current low price of European Union Allowances (EUAs). The existence of this surplus is variously attributed to e¤ects of the …nancial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent euro crisis on GDP growth, to the use of nearly 1.1 billion o¤sets, and to the promotion of wind and solar energy that has displaced generation by CO2 emitting coal and natural gas. Indeed, the existence of a "structural imbalance between supply and demand"is widely accepted and has been the motivation for the debate about "back-loading"that has dominated discussion concerning the EU ETS in 2013, as well as for the proposal made in January 2014 to establish a Market Stability Reserve. Both of these measures would reduce the number of allowances available in some near term while putting the withdrawn allowances back into circulation at a later time.
Nearly all participants, observers and analysts understand that the rules governing the use of "surplus"allowances at the end of Phase II are di¤erent from what they were at the end of Phase I (2005-07). The ETS Directive established from the beginning that any unused allowances in Phase II could be "banked," that is, carried over for use in subsequent years. In contrast, the rules developed for Phase I did not allow unused allowances to be carried over for use in Phase II. The surplus at the end of Phase I was very small (approximately 100 million allowances, less than 2% of the three-year total) and the expectation of this surplus drove the price to zero well below the end of 2007. The price at the end of Phase II was much lower (around …ve euros) than expected at the beginning of Phase II (perhaps thirty euros), but the price was never driven to zero, presumably because holders of these allowances believed they had greater unit value than the lowest prices o¤ered (around three euros).
Given the formal and casual recognition of the ability to bank allowances in Phase II for later use, it is surprising how little attention has been given to the application of allowance banking theory to the EU ETS. This neglect is the more surprising for the extent to which banking was recognized as a major factor in explaining agent behavior in the US SO2 Emissions Trading Program (Schennach, 2000; Ellerman et al., 2000; Ellerman and Montero, 2007) . That program was, however, structured very di¤erently from the EU ETS with a pre-determined sharp discontinuity in the cap and the number of a¤ected facilities between Phases I and II. In contrast, there is no similar discontinuity either in cap level or coverage in the EU ETS. A …ve-year cap was agreed for Phase II along with a linear reduction factor of 1.74% of the annualized Phase II cap that would be calculated from the mid-point of Phase II (2010), become e¤ective starting in 2013, and continue inde…nitely thereafter unless subsequently changed. This smoothly declining cap did not raise the specter of a sharp increase in the marginal cost of abatement that would create an obvious motivation to bank, as in the US SO2 Program. Still, a steadily declining cap could be expected to lead to rising marginal abatement cost over time and this was the general expectation as evidenced by no small number of modelling studies that sought to predict EUA prices beyond the next few years. The question of whether the expected increase in marginal cost would be enough to warrant banking (and if so, at what levels) seems simply never to have asked.
This paper seeks to remedy that failure of curiosity and analysis. We do not propose to attempt a de…nitive answer that settles the question once and for all time, but only to raise the question of whether allowance banking could be expected to occur in the EU ETS and if so, to explore the implications, especially concerning the levels of banked EUAs might be expected at the end of Phase II. Doing so requires …rst of all that the abstract theory of allowance banking (Rubin, 1996 ; Cronshaw and Kruse, 1996; Kling and Rubin, 1997; Leiby and Rubin, 2001 ) be …tted to the peculiarities of the EU ETS, in particular, the smoothly and modestly declining cap. The next section presents and explains the theory of allowance banking as it would be applied to the EU ETS. Section 3 discusses relevant data and reasonable values for critical parameters. Section 4 presents simulations of plausible banking outcomes for the EU ETS. Section 5 discusses these results and adds needed quali…cations. Section 6 concludes.
The Model of Intertemporal Trading

An Intuitive Explanation of Allowance Banking Applied to the EU ETS
Allowance banking is a manifestation of trading through time instead of the more familiar trading across space in the same time period. Intertemporal trading could involve borrowing, but in the EU ETS, as in most allowance trading programs, borrowing is not allowed. 1 Thus, agents cannot use tomorrow's allowances to cover today's emissions, but they can use any allowances not used to cover today's emissions to cover tomorrow's emissions.
The basic intuition of allowance banking is similar to that for spatial trading. If the marginal cost of abating a ton of emissions is higher at one place or time than at another, cost savings can be gained by reducing more where or when it is cheaper and using the allowances so generated to cover emissions where and when it is more costly. Trading across time invokes two further considerations, namely, whether borrowing is permitted and the discount rate for comparing today's and tomorrow's costs. When borrowing is not allowed, the calculation is only whether tomorrow's expected cost is higher than today's given the discount rate. If tomorrow's discounted expected cost is higher than today's cost, it is worth holding allowances, whether obtained by abating more today or by purchase, and using them to cover at least some of tomorrow's emissions. If that expectation is not true, then it is not worth doing so. It would be more pro…table to sell any allowances held, however obtained, at today's price and earn the return represented by the discount rate than to continue holding them. This would be true even if the agent expected to be purchasing allowances to cover tomorrow's emissions (with due allowance for transaction costs or other behavioural considerations).
While the theory and basic intuition of allowance banking is clear, any particular application requires …tting the theory to the structure of the particular allowance trading program. For the EU ETS, the essential features of the cap are that it starts at a level at or only slightly below counterfactual emissions and declines continuously at a pre-speci…ed linear reduction rate (LRF). The LRF implies, under the usual economic assumption of rising costs with increasing supply, and with all other things equal, that the marginal cost of abatement will rise over time as the cap declines. How much marginal cost (or the price) will rise depends not only on how much abatement is implied by the cap, but also on the marginal abatement cost (MAC) function, which determines the rate at which marginal cost rises as more abatement is required. The issue for the individual agent is whether the expected increase in marginal cost over time is greater than the discount rate. If it is, banking is justi…ed and vice versa.
Whether the expected rising cost would justify banking (and if so, how much) depends a great deal of the relationship between the cap and counterfactual emissions at the start of the trading system. Consider, for instance, an initial cap that is set at a level 1% below counterfactual emissions and that then declines at 1% per year while counterfactual emissions are constant. In the …rst year, the required abatement is 1% of counterfactual emissions, 2% in the second year, 3% in the third year and so on. Assuming a simple linear marginal cost function, marginal cost will double in the second year, increase by 50% in the next year, 33% in the following year and so forth in a continually declining series as the additional abatement required in each succeeding year becomes smaller in proportion to abatement in the past year. The applicable discount rate is unlikely to be 100%, 50%, or any of the other near-term values in this continually declining series; however, at some point in the future, the rise in the marginal cost of abatement would be less than the discount rate. Alternatively, consider a case in which the same declining cap starts at a level 50% below counterfactual emissions. The second year would require abatement 2% more than that required initially and, with linear marginal costs, the increase in price would be expected also to be 2%, quite possibly less than the discount rate. If so, there would be no allowance banking. Thus, for any trading system such as the EU ETS for which the cap starts near (and even above) counterfactual emissions and declines continually, there will likely be allowance banking. How much banking and for how long, and with what e¤ect on price, depends on the values embedded in the expectations of agents. To answer such questions and to put more structure on the manifestations and e¤ects of allowance banking, we must turn to the theory as applied to the speci…cs of the EU ETS.
The More Articulated Theory
For any trading system such as just described, there will be some period of time during which banking is justi…ed. This can be called the banking period: it starts at t = 0 and ends at t = . The future point in time designated as is when the rise in marginal abatement cost is no longer greater than the discount rate. In the intervening years, agents are willing to hold allowances for future use because doing so is expected to be pro…table. Thereafter, t , the aggregate level of emissions e t will be equal to the cap such that:
Beyond , agents would borrow if they could, but since they cannot emissions will be at the cap level.
As already noted, the annual cap Y t decreases each year by a constant rate a (known as the LRF) such that:
where Y 0 is the initial cap.
As stated in previous literature, the …rms'level of emissions can be characterized as if a single central planner was making the decision. 2 The latter faces the following dynamic abatement cost-minimization problem (P):
where C is the abatement cost, i.e. the cost of reducing emissions e t . 3 The variable u t represents counterfactual emissions (i.e. the emissions emitted without any restriction on emissions) and r corresponds to the discount rate, constant over time. B t refers to the number of allowances in the bank, assumed non-negative, which evolves according to the state equations (2) . It states that the annual change in the bank is the di¤erence between each period's cap and its emissions. Note that this latter change variable can be either positive or negative with positive values signalling a build-up of the bank and negative values indicating a draw-down of the bank.
Then, we de…ne Lagrangian expression of the problem (P):
where t and t are multipliers associated with the constraints on the change in size of the bank and on borrowing. As shown by Rubin (1996) and Schennach (2000), di¤erentiation of the Lagrangian to obtain the …rst-order conditions and further rearrangement of terms leads to the following equation for the change in the marginal cost (mc) of abatement through time, which states that the change in marginal cost over time along the optimal path will be equal to the discount rate minus the shadow price of the constraint on borrowing.
Di¤erentiate the …rst-order conditions of (4), we obtain the optimal level of emission as derivated by Schennach (2000) :
The conditions for the solution of the optimal path are such that, at the end of the banking period ( ) when the bank is exhausted (B t = 0) and the borrowing constraint (B t 0) becomes operative, the shadow price is strictly positive > 0. Consequently, marginal cost mc increases at a rate less than the discount rate. These same conditions imply that when agents are banking a positive quantity of allowances B t > 0 during the banking period, t = [0; [; the multiplier t is zero so that the marginal cost mc increases at the discount rate. During this time interval and given initial marginal cost, the evolution of marginal cost can be expressed as:
From equations (1) and (6), we derive the path of the allowance price P t over the all in…nite time horizon, from 0 to 1 such that:
From this, the path of emissions can also be deduced:
During the banking period, emissions will be equal to counterfactual emissions less the amount of abatement forthcoming at the allowance price at each point in time. Thereafter, the cap will determine emissions. The remaining task is to determine the initial level of emissions e 0 , which depends on the discount rate and the end of the banking period .
By prior reasoning and the conditions for de…ning an optimal banking program, the allowance price increases at the discount rate during the banking period. We thus can rewrite the path of price P t depending on the end of the banking period such that:
which leads to P 0 = e r mc(u Y ) and e 0 = u 0 e r mc(u Y ):
Also, since all the allowances issued over the banking period must be equal to the cumulative emissions to , we have:
Finding is then an iterative process of …nding the point in time when the conditions expressed by equation (8) is met. Any point in time before implies a lower price during the banking period, less abatement, more cumulative emissions than allowances issued until then, and therefore a violation of this condition. Conversely, any point in time after implies a higher price path, more abatement, and fewer cumulative emissions than allowances, also a violation of the condition. Once is found, everything else follows, as illustrated in the simulations. The analytical solution is presented in the Appendix.
Intertemporal Trading in the EU ETS
Data
The most easily observable data concerning allowance banking behavior are those concerning the stock of unused allowances. These data are available in the European Union Transaction Log (EUTL) and comprise installation-level information on free allocations, veri…ed emissions and surrenders of both EUAs and Kyoto o¤sets against emissions. They are published a few months after the end of each calendar year. Therefore, as of the time of writing, data are available through the end of Phase II. For each year starting with 2008, we compute the aggregate bank size using the following expression: in 2008) . However, the bank turns positive in 2009 and accumulates rapidly, with the greatest addition in absolute terms occuring during the 2012 compliance year, the …nal year of Phase II. At the end of Phase II the bank stood at almost 1.5 billion EUAs, corresponding to about 75% of the aggregate annual cap. Since EUAs are bankable between Phases II and III without restrictions, the bank from the 2012 compliance year can be carried forward into future years.
Discussion of Parameter Space
Applying the allowance banking theory explained above to the EU ETS and simulating how agents might have reasonably been expected to behave requires assumptions about 6 To compute the correct size of the bank at a sub-system level we would also require information on sales and purchases of EUAs, for which data are not available until several years later. However, these transactions cancel out at the aggregate level, so that we can compute the correct size of the aggregate EUA bank without requiring information on transfers. 7 In general, o¤sets are not banked since they have less value than EUAs and their future acceptability is subject to some uncertainty. Also, auctioned allowances should be included however the volumes and timing are not evident in the EUTL.Member states reserved a total of approximately 300 milliion EUAs for auctioning over Phase II (Ellerman et al., 2010, p. 62 ). In addition, EUAs in new entrant resrves that were not issued are often auctioned near the end or after the end of Phase II. Auctioned allowances would have to be included in any accurate estimate of the end-of-Phase II bank ; however, as will be seen the non-inclusion of these allowances would not materially alter the results and conclusions of this paper. several parameters. The goal of the simulations presented in the next section should be considered exploratory and expository rather than an attempt to model accurately the past and future development of the EUA bank. We remind the reader that the simulations correspond to the model as presented in the previous section of this paper, i.e. the world is perfectly deterministic and there are no shocks or changes in expectations concerning the relevant variables. Of course, in reality shocks do occur and expectations may and typically will change over time. Each such change implies new optimal paths for prices, emissions, and the number of allowances banked, which start from the achieved point on the earlier set of paths. The transition or movement from the earlier equilibrium paths to the new paths may be quick or extended over some transition period as new information becomes clearer. Still, the fundamental insights and motivations for banking remain and the basic structure will remain unchanged. For these reasons, no attempt is made to calibrate parameter values to match the paths observed to date. However, the e¤ect of reasonable variations in parameter values are presented and discussed to provide the reader with a sense of how results are a¤ected by changes in these values.
Discount Rate
The futures market for EUAs provides data concerning the discount rate that agents apply in valuing present and future values at least for the term of the various futures contracts. Unfortunately, these contracts extend only three to four years into the future, less than what the banking period would likely be, but they are a starting point. Moreover, the yield curves in these contracts are remarkably stable, much as would be expected given the Hotelling-like price path that is predicted by equation (5), and very unlike the variations from backwardation to contango that can be observed in the futures markets for commodities (Ellerman, Marcantonini and Zaklan, 2014) . 8 The implied discount rates are always positive and since the beginning of 2008 they have varied between a low of 1.4% and a high of 9.1% with most observations falling between 2.5% and 5.5%. 9 These rates have had no evident relation to the euro discount rate set by the European Central Bank, which started the period at 4% and had been reduced to 0.75% in 2012 and more recently to 0.25%. For the simulations that follow, a central rate of 4.0% is used, with variations of 3.0% and 5.0%.
Growth in Counterfactual Emissions
Counterfactual emissions, the evolution of emissions in the absence of the EU ETS, are not known with any certainty, but some estimate of these emissions and therefore of the abatement occasioned by the EU ETS, is implicit in today's price, not to mention future prices. As discussed in Ellerman et al. (2010), reconstructions of pre-2005 emissions for the ETS sectors indicated a rate of increase of about 1% per annum since 2000 at a time when EU15 GDP was increasing at a rate of about 2%. These data imply a 1% rate of decline in CO2 emissions per unit of GDP and are consistent with the regularly observed secular improvement in the carbon e¢ ciency of economies which is often used modelling the relation between GDP growth and CO2 emissions. For the purpose of the simulations presented here, high and low growth assumptions are presented, as well as a middle value. These assumptions can be taken to re ‡ect the relatively optimistic expectations concerning economic growth that prevailed until the …nancial crisis of late 2008 and the considerably dampened expectations that have prevailed since. Counterfactual emissions are assumed to increase at a constant rate g, for which the upper and lower values are 1.0% and 0.1% annual growth with 0.5% as the intermediate value.
Assuming an underlying trend of 1.0% improvement in the carbon e¢ ciency of the economy, these values imply growth rates for output in the ETS sectors between 1% and 2% per annum. Again, no claim is made that these values are accurate re ‡ections of the expectations that have informed market and banking behavior. They are plausible, but their value for our present purpose is illustrative.
Slope Coe¢ cient of the Declining Cap
In contrast to counterfactual emissions, the cap is always known, embedded in legislation with as much certainty as implemented policy provides. In the case of the EU ETS, the rate of decline is speci…ed in the amended ETS Directive, 1.74% annually. 1011 The relation of this precisely de…ned cap to initial counterfactual relations is not known, but it is widely believed that the initial EU ETS cap was at or very little below businessas-usual emissions. For simplicity, we assume that the initial level of both the cap and counterfactual emissions is the same and that the cap declines inde…nitely at a constant 10 In its recent communication concerning the 2030 framework for climate and energy policy, the European Commission has suggested that a decline rate of 2.2% starting in 2021 would be consistent with the proposed legally binding target of reducing EU GHG emissions to 40% below 1990 levels by 2030. However, a speci…c proposal to do so was not put forward at this time. That will be one of the many measures to be decided following the Parliamentary elections in May 2014 and the installation of a new Commission thereafter. 11 By implementing regulation, this linear reduction factor has been interpreted as a constant decrement equal to 1.74% of the average annual cap in Phase II. In the interest of simplicity, we ignore what will be an accelerating decrement when expressed as a proportion of each year's cap. This detail will modify speci…c results but not change the basic nature of banking or the conclusions presented here. rate a of 1.74% annually.
Speci…cation of the Marginal Abatement Cost Function
The shape of the aggregate marginal abatement cost function is perhaps the least researched aspect of the EU ETS. Every model representing the EU ETS implicitly has such a function, which is inevitably the result of values assigned to various elasticities or to cost engineering data. The common feature of all is the economic intuition that marginal costs rise as the amount of abatement increases. As others have done (cf. Schennach, 2000 , and Ellerman and Montero, 2007), we assume a time-invariant, linear marginal cost function with parameters chosen for the underlying total cost function to yield prices roughly in line with observations. Figure 1 illustrates the simulation results for the baseline case, where counterfactual emissions grow at an annual rate of 0.5% and the representative agent discounts the future at a rate of 4%. In this …gure and subsequent ones, results are measured both by quantities and prices. In Figure 1 , the cap, counterfactual emissions, and the optimal emission path are to be read against the millions of tons of CO2 on the left-side scale. The price path should be read against the right-side scale which is in euros per ton of CO2. The evolution of the bank itself in this baseline case is the middle line in Figure 2 . The vertical line in Figure 1 marks the end of the banking period (2043). This is when the emissions path becomes permanently coincident with the cap because of the inability to bank and a kink is observed in the price path when the rate of increase in allowance prices becomes less than the discount rate. Comparing the optimal emissions path with the cap shows that emissions will be below the cap for an initial sub-period of accumulation, ending in 2019 for this simulation. Thereafter, the accumulated bank is drawn down over a period of 24 years and emissions exceed the cap in these years. Of course, for the banking period as a whole, cumulative emissions equal cumulative allowed emissions. The cross-over year-when emissions momentarily equal the cap and the drawdown of the bank starts-is also when the bank reaches its peak value. Note also that the accumulation phase is considerably shorter (11 years) than the draw-down phase (24 years), which implies that average amount by which emissions are below the cap in the accumulation phase is roughly twice the average by which emissions will be above the cap in the subsequent draw-down phase. In the following we explore the e¤ects of varying the discount rate, rate of growth in counterfactual and slope of the cap on the optimal banking and price paths.
Simulations
Emissions and Prices in the Baseline Case
Changing the Discount Rate
Varying the discount rate generates substantial changes both in the size of the bank and in the length of the banking period (Figure 2 ).
For instance, applying a discount rate of 5% shortens the banking period by 7 years compared to the baseline case using a 4% discount rate and decreases the maximal bank by about one third. Applying a 3% discount rate lengthens the banking period by 10 years and increases bank's maximum size by more than 50%. Variations in discount rates also have an impact on the optimal permit price path (Figure 3) . Changing the discount rate not only alters the rate of price increase during the banking period but also changes the length of the banking period determined by and thereby the associated reference price that anchors the price path during the banking period. Mechanically, a lower discount rate means that the point when marginal abatement cost rises less than the discount rate is farther in the future. The lower discount rate makes future abatement more costly relative to the present thereby justi…ying more early abatement to mitigate those costs, a higher initial price, a longer banking period and a larger bank. A higher discount rate has the opposite e¤ect.
Varying the Growth Rate in Counterfactual Emissions
Varying the growth rate of counterfactual emissions mainly a¤ects the maximal size of the bank (Figure 4) and has, in comparison to changes in the discount rate, relatively little impact on the length of the banking period. Whether the growth rate is 0.1% or 1.0% changes the length of the banking period by only 4 years. However, the e¤ect on the maximal bank size is more substantial. Changing the BAU emissions growth from the middle value of 0.5% to 1% increases the size of the bank by almost 50%, and a change of the growth rate in the opposite direction, from 0.5% to 0.1%, decreases the maximal bank size by about 25% with respect to the baseline case. Changing the growth rate in BAU emissions also strongly a¤ects the price path ( Figure 5 ), since greater growth in counterfactual emissions requires more abatement and shifts up the price path without changing the rate of increase in marginal cost and price. 
Ex Post Comparison with Observed Data
This paper started with the observation that allowance banking might explain the 1.5 billion stock of allowances existing at the end of Phase II of the EU ETS. A cursory examination of Figures 2 and 4 show that, under the assumptions used, a stock of allowances would have been built up during the …rst …ve years of the ETS and that the optimal level at the end of 2012 would have been somewhere between 1.3 billion and 3.0 billion depending on parameter values. Moreover, all of these simulations suggest that the banking build-up has several years to go. On this evidence alone, allowance banking would seem to o¤er an explanation for the accumulated Phase II surplus. Perhaps, the current level of the bank is larger (or smaller) than what a more thorough and careful consideration of parameter values would suggest, but the fact that allowance banking would lead to comparable numbers should at the very least give pause to those who would suggest that the existence of such a surplus indicates some deep ‡aw in the design or functioning of the EU ETS. Instead, it suggests a rational response by agents facing future scarcity who anticipate rising costs at a rate than the discount they apply in evaluating present and future costs.
Observed prices o¤er another point of comparison between theory and observed practice. The evolution of allowance prices during Phase II has been anything but steadily rising along a path such as those depicted in Figures 3 and 5 . However, each path assumes no change in expectations concerning relevant values governing allowance banking behavior over the entire horizon. It can be seen as a snapshot of the paths implicit in the solution of this dynamic problem for the set of expectations prevailing at some point in time. In reality, the various optimal paths will be less smooth as agents move from one desired dynamic equilibrium to another and thereby adjust to changes in expectation or the variables such as the discount rate that will govern their banking behavior. As is widely recognized, expectations concerning GDP growth, and therefore growth in counterfactual emissions, in the EU are certainly less today than they were in 2007 and early 2008 when the price was in the 20s and expected to be in the 30s at the end of Phase II. As already noted and illustrated in Figure 5 , such a change in expectations would shift the price downward onto a new equilibirum price path. We would not suggest that a change in expectations concerning counterfactual emissions explains all of the observed price decline from 2008 to the present, but it is certainly a contributing factor.
What is more supportive of banking behavior is the observed yield curve for EUA futures for the three to four years that can be observed, as well as that implied by expert predictions, usually re ‡ecting an industry consensus, that prices farther in the future will be higher than those observed today. For example in February 2008, the spot and promptfuture prices were in the low twenties and the 2012 contract around 25 euros. Predictions of more distant prices, for example in 2020, were in the thirties. In March 2013, the spot and prompt future were at six euros, the most distant futures contract (2017) at eight euros and predictions of more distant prices typically in the teens. The current price may be higher and lower for a number of reasons but future prices seem always to be expected to increase in the manner that would be predicted by banking theory based on what is expected at each point in time. When the current price changes signi…cantly, as it did coincident with the late 2008 …nancial crisis and again in 2011 when the eurocrisis was at its peak, the yield curves simply shift from higher to lower across the time horizon as would be suggested by a system moving from one dynamic equilibrium to another.
Furthermore, the market prices themselves clearly indicate that agents expect future scarcity. Despite all that has been said about low EUA prices and lack of demand, the fact remains that the post-Phase I price never went to zero, as the price for Phase I allowances did at the end of 2007. However indistinctly perceived, expectations of future scarcity at the end of Phase II were a su¢ cient reality to the agents continuing to hold these banked allowances to justify not selling at prices that went as low as three euros in April 2013. Evidence that agents anticipate future scarcity in the EU ETS was also present at the beginning of Phase II and even before. Phase II futures could be purchased in 2007, the last year of Phase I, at prices ranging from 15 euros to 23 euros at the same time that the Phase I price was collapsing to zero because of the inability to bank unused allowances. In summary, in spite of falling prices, all evidence suggests that agents look beyond the current year and that, regardless of current circumstances and price, they expect future scarcity. This is the recipe for banking.
We hasten to add that the theory presented in this paper is an abstraction and the equations a formalization of the behavior that will be observed based on the basic intuition that if banking is allowed and discounted future marginal costs are expected to be higher than those today, it makes sense to abate more now to produce allowances for banking in order to reduce those higher future costs, or to purchase allowances now, and hold them, for the same reason. This is an expectation that is within the grasp of any forward-looking agent and the existence of a bank in the initial years of a cap-and-trade system structured like the EU ETS would be an indication that future scarcity is expected and that agents are responding rationally.
Having made the case that allowance banking explains at least part of the accumulated stock of allowances at the end of Phase II, we want to note the many quali…cations. The uncertainties of the parameter values has been abundantly discussed already. Real data cannot be expected to track precisely the smooth paths that result from the theory and that have been illustrated above. There will always be random variations around these trends andthe important results are the directions and approximate levels.
More serious quali…cations concern the theory itself. The theory as we have applied it assumes that agents are so far-seeing as to be thinking about 2043 for instance. Agents may be easily assumed to be forward-looking, but do their horizons extend thirty years and even more into the future? And, if the reality is truncated horizons that are updated and moved forward as time progresses, what is the relevant time span and how should we think about the terminal condition that has such a strong in ‡uence over the level of pricing during that time span? More importantly for our purposes, how would such behavior change the equilibrium paths that have been presented in the body of this paper?
Another issue arises in a multi-national system with agents using di¤erent currencies in countries with di¤ering monetary regimes. The theory assumes a single uniformly applicable discount rate for all agents as if all operated within a single state. EUAs are denominated and traded in euros and most of the agents in the EU ETS operate in countries where the currency is the euro and where the discount rates used by agents might be assumed to re ‡ect with varying premia the discount rate established by the European Central Bank. However, a sizeable minority of installations operate in countries where the euro is not the currency and under monetary regimes with di¤erent discount rates. While agents in these countries may buy and sell EUAs denominated in euros, their accounting is ultimately in their own currency mediated by an exchange rate and perhaps applying discount rates di¤erent from those of their counterparts in member states using the euro. In our simulations, a range of discount rates emerging from the relatively shortterm pricing of EUA futures is used and this might be viewed as the expression of the market aggregation of these potentially heterogeneous discount rates, but our choice has no rationale other than that it can be directly connected to market pricing of EUAs in di¤erent time periods. As noted, this discount rate bears little relation to the euro discount rate during Phase II, which might be thought to be the basis of the discount rates plus appropriate premia used the the majority of agents participating in the EU ETS.
Conclusion
Allowance banking has been a neglected subject on the research agenda concerning the EU ETS. Our hope is that this preliminary analysis will convince researchers interested in the EU ETS, or more generally in carbon markets, that the topic belongs on that agenda. As the preceding comments indicate, there are plenty of open questions. What should not be open, however, is whether allowance banking must be considered in explaining observed phenomena in the EU ETS and in particular the stock of unused allowances that has been accumulated in the course of Phase II and into Phase III. For too long, the facile explanation of « over-allocation » has been used when the reality is more complicated and involves economic choices by optimizing agents, rather than purely a failure of administrative systems, as the term over-allocation may suggest. One key lesson of this analysis of allowance banking in the EU ETS is that it is rational to decrease emissions below the cap at the start of the banking period to minimize abatement costs over time. The observed EUA bank at the end of Phase II falls within the range of values indicated by the illustrative simulations presented in this paper suggesting behavior by agents consistent with intertemporal cost minimization. This is good news for it reveals a form of voluntary early action triggered by the particular structure of the cap in the EU ETS, namely, one that starts out near or at the level of initial business-as-usual emissions and declines steadily thereafter. This structure can be found in one form or another in other proposed and implemented CO2 emissions trading systems and it seems likely to characterize future greenhouse gas trading systems, given the nature of the problem being addressed and the available technology. The logic of allowance banking would suggest, and the experience with the EU ETS seems to bear out, that when banking is allowed and agents are faced with a credible prospect of future scarcity, they will reduce emissions initially more than required in order to capture the gains that come from intertemporal cost minimization.
Appendix: Analytical Solution
To facilitate the analysis and to obtain tractable results, the marginal cost mc is assumed to be a linear function. As Schennach (2000), we rewritte mc as: mc(u t e t ) = (e u t e t )B where the variable e u t = A t =B + u t . Then, the paths of emissions and price are such that: Putting equation (7) into (8), we obtain:
We could then replace e 0 and in the path of price and emissions.
